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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the Republic of Korea has experienced significantchange in both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows since the
1997 Asian financial crisis.  The analysis indicates that a rapid increase in exports at
the onset of the crisis helped to improve foreign reserves of the Republic of Korea and
also helped the economy to recover from severe recession.  Despite the crisis, the
importance of the Chinese market has steadily increased to the point where it is the
most important export market for the Republic of Korea, largely at the expense of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) market.
The crisis also had a significant impact on FDI inflows, both in terms of source
country and host industry.  FDI increased sharply following the crisis, and this rapid
increase was largely due to higher United States and European Union investment in
the service sector, which is consistent with the wealth effect hypothesis on FDI flows.
Meanwhile, Japanese FDI decreased, resulting in a decline in FDI in the
manufacturing sector.  However, the expected spillover effects of FDI are debatable,
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due largely to a sharp increase in mergers and acquisitions, and FDI dried up in
technology-intensive manufacturing industry.  In contrast, the Republic of Korea’s
outward direct investment seemed to be little influenced by the financial crisis,
although a further study of the implications of the crisis for the Republic of Korea’s
outward direct investment in developing countries, including the traditionally popular
Asian region, also needs to be investigated further.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to investigate movements in the Republic of Korea’s trade and
foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns including its outward direct investment (ODI)
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Special attention will be placed on the analysis of
policy issues and the challenges that arose in conjunction with the recovery of the economy
of the Republic of Korea.
Why did the country’s economy recover so quickly from the 1997 financial crisis?
While the causes of the financial crisis are still controversial among economists, the
subsequent recovery of the Republic of Korea’s GDP growth rate was rapid and took the
form of a V-shaped recovery (Aoki and Min, 2003).  The GDP growth rate was 10.9 per
cent in 1999 compared with -6.7 per cent in 1998; it was 9.3 per cent in 2000 although it
dropped somewhat (3.0 per cent) in 2001.1  There are many aspects to the Republic of
Korea’s recovery from both macro- and microeconomic perspectives.
Macroeconomic factors include a decline in interest rates from around 20 per cent
per annum following the crisis to 5-6 per cent, which helped to break the vicious circle of
high interest rates and corporate bankruptcies; they also include uncertainty caused by an
increase in unemployment rates from the historical level of 4 to 11 per cent, motivating
households to increase their savings, which in turn helped to improve the current account in
a climate of poor corporate investment.  Yet another factor was the Government’s successful
effort in rolling-over foreign debts and stabilizing foreign exchange markets (Aoki and Min,
2003).
From a microeconomic perspective the Republic of Korea has restructured both
the corporate and financial sectors.  The collapse of the Daewoo Group and dismantling of
the Hyundai Group demonstrate that the notion that some companies were “too big to fail”
is no longer valid.  This restructuring has improved governance systems and the reliability
of accounting information, strengthened competition policy for business conglomerates
(continued from page 3)
1 The GDP growth rate rose to 7.0 per cent in 2002 but dropped again to 3.1 per cent in 2003.
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(the so-called chaebol), which helped to enhance economic efficiency and national
competitiveness, and created market-friendly economic reforms such as the introduction of
a managed floating exchange rate system (Min, 1999 and 2003).
Having taken these important domestic factors into account, this paper will focus
on the Republic of Korea’s trade and FDI in the period of crisis and recovery.  It
demonstrates that the impact of the 1997 financial crisis was significant across the
economy.  Special attention will be placed on the recovery of the economy by illustrating
that the information/communication technology-led export boom, combined with policy
reforms and subsequently increased FDI inflows, has significantly contributed to the
recovery.  Some challenges for foreign direct investment (inflows and outflows) and trade
following the crisis will also be discussed.
The paper is structured as follows:  section 2 analyses the Republic of Korea’s
exports and its economic recovery, showing that a sharp increase in exports and foreign
reserves was crucial to both restoring foreign investors’ confidence and capital-market
stabilization.  Section 3 investigates the impact of the financial crisis, focusing on policy
reforms and FDI inflows.  This section shows that the Government of the Republic of Korea
re-emphasized the importance of FDI to secure long-term commitments of foreign capital
and the transfer of advanced technology and managerial know-how.  Section 4 describes
changes in FDI inflows and FDI outflows.  Changes in FDI are discussed both in terms of
source country and host industry.  Some implications of the expansion of the Republic of
Korea’s ODI in Asia will also be explored.  Section 5 examines some challenging issues
such as the externalities controversy surrounding FDI, the terms of trade and market
diversification.  Section 6 contains a summary and conclusions.
2. EXPORT, CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS AND RECOVERY
(a) Exports and growth
Figure 1 illustrates two important factors in relation to the Republic of Korea’s
economy.  First, the fast recovery was led by increased exports and an improved trade
balance.  The Republic of Korea’s trade balance was -$11 billion in 1996 and -$8 billion in
1997, respectively.  However, the balance has shifted both in terms of sign and magnitude
since the crisis.  The Republic of Korea had a surplus in its overall trade balance between
1998 and 2002, with a balance of $29 billion in 1998 and $24 billion in 1999, record
surpluses in the history of the country’s trade balance; however, the figures declined to
about $9-12 billion between 2000 and 2002.
Figure 1 also shows that the GDP growth rate remained relatively high, although it
fluctuated between 9.2 and 5 per cent between 1990 and 1997.  It also indicates the
resilience of the country’s economy, as demonstrated by its rapid recovery.  The Republic of
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Korea’s GDP contracted by 6.7 per cent in 1998 compared with that of the previous year.
However, the growth rate recovered quickly to 10.9 per cent in 1999 and 9.3 per cent in
2000, respectively.  While it dropped to 3 per cent in 2001, the growth rate bounced back
from 2002 onwards.
Second, exports have been an important determinant of growth in the Republic of
Korea.  Changes in the trade balance reflect the total demand for home goods in the GDP
equation.  The potential benefits of exports for growth are due to the spillover from the
export sector and productivity externalities, higher rates of capital formation and facilitation
of capital imports through a lessening of foreign exchange constraints.
While the employment effects of export growth are still being debated, most of
these benefits seem to have been present in the Republic of Korea’s recovery (see figure 2).
The graph shows the contribution of exports to the Republic of Korea’s GDP growth rate
(left scale), measured by the contribution of exports to GDP growth divided by the GDP
growth rate, and to employment (right scale) over the last three decades.  While both
indicators fluctuated over the period, these figures show that the contribution of exports to
both the GDP growth rate and employment was significant after the 1997 crisis.  In
particular, the contribution of exports to employment after the crisis increased sharply from
about 10 per cent in 1997 to about 18 per cent in 2002.  However, we note that the economy
of the Republic of Korea recently experienced growth without generating additional
employment.  This is largely due to increases in the export of less labour-intensive products
such as information technology (Shin, 2004).  Furthermore, increased ODI in labour-intensive
industries also adversely affected employment opportunities in the Republic of Korea.
The contribution of exports to the economy of the Republic of Korea can also be
confirmed by the high ratio of exports to GDP (EX/GDP) shown in figure 3.  This ratio
remained relatively stable at about 30 per cent before the crisis.  It increased significantly
after the crisis, reaching around 40 per cent, indicating that the importance of exports to the
country’s economy increased.
Figure 1.  GDP growth, exports and trade balance
Source: Bank of Korea (various years).  National Account.
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Figure 2.  Export contribution to GDP growth and employment
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Information and Energy (various years).  <www.mocie.go.kr/korean/pds/
statistics/invest>.
Figure 3.  GDP growth and exports, 1980-2001
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years) and Major Statistics of Korean Economy,
(various years).
Note: The ratio of exports to GDP (DEX/DGDP) is calculated by the change in value of exports divided
by change in value of GDP in United States dollars.
However, the movement of exports following the crisis illustrates that a rise in
exports per se does not necessarily increase people’s living standards proportionately.  The
incremental increases in exports as a percentage of GDP (measured by the change in value
of exports divided by the change in value of GDP) indicate that the Republic of Korea’s
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export growth following the crisis was based largely on increased volume facilitated by
lower unit prices (i.e., push factors).  The ratio (DEX/DGDP) in the figure increased in the
early 1990s, but dropped sharply after 1995 when the unit export price dropped sharply.  In
particular, the incremental share dropped below zero in 1998 (and again in 2001), indicating
that the negative effect of lower export prices was more than offsetting the positive effect of
higher export volume following the sharp depreciation of the “won” currency during the
crisis.  While the unit export price did not recover, the increase in the incremental share did
rebound with rising export volumes.
(b) Stabilized foreign exchange market
The current account surplus, coupled with the visible government-led restructuring
of the banking (financial) sector and chaebol, was crucial to the recovery of foreign investor
confidence in the economy of the Republic of Korea.
Most Asian countries, including Japan, experienced a banking crisis during this
period, owing to a large number of non-performing loans (about 14-19 per cent) resulting
from Japan’s “bubble economy” in the 1990s.  However, one of the crucial differences
between the crisis in East Asian countries and in Japan was the amount of available foreign
reserves before the crisis.2  In East Asia low foreign reserves, under a pegged exchange rate
system, triggered speculative attacks on those countries’ currencies and led to herd
behaviour and capital flight.
A current account surplus is crucial to the increase in foreign reserves.  Figure 4
illustrates that the Republic of Korea’s current account mirrored capital inflows until 1997.
However, the sharp increase in the current account surplus following the crisis has been
much larger than capital inflows.  As a result, the foreign reserve level increased
dramatically in 1998.  The increase in the current account surplus declined in 1999,
although the current account remained in surplus.  This surplus, coupled with a fall in net
foreign assets, contributed to higher foreign reserves in 1999.  The amount of foreign
reserves increased from $3.9 billion before the onset of the crisis to around $95 billion in
mid-2000 and $150 billion (33 per cent of GDP in 2000) in late 2003.  This increase in
foreign reserves contributed to a restoration of foreign investor confidence in the value of
the won, as demonstrated by the sharp appreciation of the won from late 1998.
However, an interesting question concerns whether or not foreign reserves are
strictly necessary when a currency has been floated.  Maintaining foreign reserves implies
the existence of quasi-taxation, as the opportunity cost of keeping the reserves is relatively
high.
2 One major difference is that East Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea, relied largely on short-term
foreign debt for their savings-investment imbalance (Aoki and Min, 2003).  Also, Japan adopted a floating
exchange rate regime, whereas most East Asian countries adopted a pegged exchange rate system.
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3. IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA’S GLOBALIZATION POLICY ON FDI
The 1997 financial crisis has led to a significant change in globalization strategies,
including that of the capital market.  In particular, reforms have focused on FDI inflows by
allowing mergers and acquisitions (M and As) and classifying long-term (more than five
years) loans as FDI.
The system of conventional acceptance of FDI notification was changed to one of
simple notification (i.e., a complete notification system) with the introduction and
implementation of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act in November 1998.  This
simplified procedure related to FDI through the acquisition of newly issued stocks (i.e., the
establishment of 100 per cent subsidiaries, joint ventures and participation in capital
increase) and through the acquisition of outstanding stocks.  Foreign investors were allowed
to engage in M and As with the permission of the board of the targeted company and of the
Ministry of Finance and Economy as long as the total size of assets was less than 2 trillion
won (approximately $2 billion).3  In addition, removal of the remaining restrictions on FDI,
including coverage and relevant institutional settings, was noticeable in view of the
significant liberalization of goods before the crisis (Korea Investment Service Center,
1998).4  Long-term loans to improve facilities from foreign investors with a maturity of
more than five years were regarded as FDI.
Out of a total of 1,148 FDI subject sectors, 1,117 sectors were completely opened
and 18 sectors were partially opened to foreign investors at the end of 1998.  Partially
opened industries include cattle-raising, inshore/coastal fishing, alcohol distilling, tobacco,
Figure 4.  Current account, capital account and foreign reserves
Source: Bank of Korea (various years).  National Account.
3 Foreign investors would require permission from the Ministry of Finance and Economy if the size of the
targeted firm is more than 2 trillion won.
4 See Korea Trade Association and Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (1997) for the tariffs, and
Han (1998) for the liberalization of the service market.
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power, gambling and some logistics and communication and media-related industries.  The
sectors that remained closed include some areas of national defence.  Protection of the
foreign investors’ remittances of dividends and proceeds from sales generated from stocks
and equities, as well as of principal and interest paid overseas from long-term loan contracts
was strengthened.  Overall, foreign investors enjoyed a more level playing field in the
Republic of Korea.5
Tax incentive systems, finance and land support were also strengthened.  Tax
exemptions and reductions particularly targeted (a) businesses that produce advanced
technologies, (b) service industries that support the manufacturing sector and are designated
as subject to tax exemption and reductions and (c) businesses located in free export zones.6
These benefits include 100 per cent tax exemption for the first 7 years from the year in
which income is first generated and a 50 per cent reduction for the ensuing 3 years.
Financial support includes the allowance of short-term loans by foreign investors in
specified cases.  The Government also designated several new free economic zones, such as
in Kwangju, Cheonan and Incheon, for FDI promotion.
The rationale behind this reform in favour FDI is as follows.  First, having
experienced the adverse effects of the quick decline (capital flight) in short-term capital, the
Government of the Republic of Korea preferred the longer-term commitment of FDI
inflows to short-term capital (portfolio) inflows.  Second, an increase in long-term capital
inflows via FDI was expected to send a positive signal for short-term capital flows on the
capital account.  Third, the Government wanted to improve economic fundamentals by
transferring technology and managerial know-how from multinational enterprises, although
the magnitude of such positive externalities has yet to be investigated.7
4. FDI AND RECOVERY OF FOREIGN INVESTORS’ CONFIDENCE
(a) FDI inflows
As described in section 3, the Government of the Republic of Korea removed
regulations on FDI and strengthened incentives significantly after the 1997 financial crisis.
In addition to its change in globalization policy and a recognized high standard of labour
quality, the improved current account produced by expanded exports and a stabilized
5 In fact, foreign investors enjoy more favourable treatment than citizens of the Republic of Korea in terms of
tax reductions and exemptions and location of investment.
6 These industries include (a) electronics, information and electrical parts such as industry/motor vehicle
controlling systems, (b) precision machinery, (c) materials for basic material industries, (d) new materials,
bio-industry, (e) optical science, medical machinery, (f) airspace, logistics and (g) environment, energy and
construction such as sewerage treatment.
7 See Lee and Cho (2003) concerning the possibility of technology transfer via multinational enterprise in the
information technology industry in the Republic of Korea.
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foreign exchange market was helpful in the recovery of foreign investor confidence, which
is evidenced by the surge of FDI flows into the Republic of Korea (see figure 5).
FDI inflows were slowly increasing before the 1997 crisis.  The amount of FDI
inflows totaled $1.9 billion in 1995 and $3.2 billion in 1996, but this constituted only 1.5
and 2.5 per cent respectively of the Republic of Korea’s exports.  In contrast to the
dwindling ODI, FDI inflows began to surge from 1997 and maintained strong growth until
2002 when FDI began to decline, a trend that has since continued.  FDI inflows in 1997
were valued at $7 billion, which is more than double the previous year’s figure.  FDI
inflows peaked in 1999 and 2000, reaching $15.5 billion (11 per cent of exports) and
$15.2 billion (8.8 per cent of exports), respectively.  This was followed by a downturn until
2003, although the inflows picked up again in 2004.
The increased FDI inflows following the crisis provide evidence of the recovery in
the confidence of foreign investors in the economy of the Republic of Korea, although the
inflows were also boosted by policy reforms aimed at removing distortions in FDI and the
depreciation of the won currency.  More specifically, this increase is attributable to pull
factors and push factors.  The pull factors were largely generated by policy reforms aimed
at FDI, including granting permission for (hostile) M and As, new fiscal (taxation)
incentives and fewer restrictions on foreign ownership.  The push factors included the
wealth effect created by the depreciation of the won against investors’ home currencies.
Exchange rate movement is a determinant of FDI flows.  For example, the surge of
Figure 5.  Republic of Korea’s foreign direct investment and
outward direct investment
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Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Information and Energy <www.mocie.go.kr/korean/pds/statistics/invest>;
Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998; Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various years).
Notes: Outward direct investment is arrival basis and foreign direct investment is notification basis.
Average arrival rate (arrival/notification) for foreign direct investment between 1998 and 2003 was around 60 per cent.
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Japanese FDI into the United States in the 1980s was associated largely with the
appreciation of the yen against the United States dollar, and this increased the bargaining
power of the Japanese bidder, a phenomenon known as the wealth effect (Froot and Stein,
1991).
The value of the won dropped sharply during the 1997 financial crisis.  At the end
of 1997, the value of the won had depreciated by 40.4 per cent against the United States
dollar and by 33.2 per cent against the Japanese yen compared with its value at the end of
1996.  The trade-weighted CPI-based real exchange rate in the fourth quarter of 1997 and
first quarter of 1998 also had depreciated by 17.6 and 34.0 per cent compared with the
fourth quarter of 1996.  By the end of the first half of 2000, however, the nominal exchange
rate of the won with the Unites States dollar was stable at around 1,120, or 1,060 won per
100 Japanese yen.
The “boom and bust” cycle of FDI along with the onset of the exchange rate crisis
seemed to support the wealth effect hypothesis.  However, the resurgence of FDI in 2004
also indicates that increases in FDI are not sustainable without the foreign investors’
confidence in the host economy.
Table 1 clearly illustrates that increased FDI inflows after the crisis were largely
led by improved United States and European Union investment at the expense of Japanese
investment.  The share of United States investment in the Republic of Korea before the
crisis was around 27-30 per cent, but this increased rapidly after 1996.  United States
investment accounted for the lion’s share of foreign investment in the period 1997-1998,
although it dropped in the period 1999-2000.  However, United States investment rose again
to account for nearly half of FDI inflows in 2002, before dropping sharply to 19.2 per cent
and then resurging to 36.9 per cent in 2004.  The table also indicates that European Union
investment increased continuously until 1999.  However, FDI in the Republic of Korea
from the European Union began to decline in 2000, although it increased sharply in 2003
before declining again in 2004.  The share of Japanese FDI in the Republic of Korea
between 1962 and 1990 was 48.2 per cent.  However, it dropped to 3.8 per cent in 1997,
although it has picked up a little since then.  Despite this recovery, with some fluctuations,
Japanese investment never regained the historically high level recorded between the 1970s
and mid-1990s.
Table 1 also shows a dramatic change in FDI by industry.  Traditionally, most FDI
has flowed into the manufacturing sector.  The share of FDI in manufacturing stayed
between approximately 53 and 65 per cent over the period from 1962 to 1996.  However,
the service sector has recently taken a greater share.  This dramatic change accelerated after
the 1997 crisis.  The service sector’s share of total FDI increased continuously after the
crisis and peaked at 73.1 per cent in 2002.
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This change in FDI by sector reflects the change in source countries and in the
comparative advantage of the economy of the Republic of Korea.  Most Japanese
investment was directed towards the country’s manufacturing sector, and this is consistent
with the high share (65.4 per cent) of foreign investment in manufacturing in the Republic
of Korea over the period from 1962 to 1990.  Because of increased wages, some areas of
manufacturing in the Republic of Korea seem to have lost their comparative advantage over
China and ASEAN.  In contrast to Japanese investment, United States and European Union
investment in the service sector increased, particularly after the financial crisis.  This
includes investment in the financial sector as well as in the property market.  The
Government of the Republic of Korea planned to sell some troubled banks to foreigners and
to open service markets, including distribution channels, to foreign investors.  Since the
onset of the financial crisis, foreign investors have purchased buildings in Seoul worth more
than $4 billion, which is the reverse situation to the purchase by Japanese investors of
buildings in New York in the late 1980s (Froot and Stein, 1991).  This change in FDI by
sector also supports the wealth hypothesis of FDI inflows.
Table 1.  Foreign direct investment in the Republic of Korea
by source country and host industry
Source Country
Host Industry
Total
(Percentage of total amount)
(Percentage of total
amount)
Amount
(in millions
United European Manu-of United Cases
States Union
Japan
facturing
Services
States
dollars)
1962-1990 7 874 5 337 28.5 12.5 48.2 65.4 34.1
1991-1995 6 598 2 929 29.9 32.5 23.0 53.7 46.4
1996 3 203 968 27.4 27.9 8.0 60.3 39.2
1997 6 971 1 055 45.8 33.1 3.8 33.7 65.8
1998 8 852 1 399 33.6 32.6 5.7 64.8 33.2
1999 15 541 2 173 24.1 40.3 11.3 45.9 53.8
2000 15 697 4 271 18.6 28.0 15.6 43.4 56.3
2001 11 291 3 418 34.4 27.1 6.8 27.4 72.6
2002 9 101 2 435 49.4 18.3 15.4 26.7 73.1
2003 6 468 2 564 19.2 47.3 8.3 26.2 63.9
2004 12 784 3 068 36.9 23.5 17.7 48.6 48.0
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Information and Energy <www.mocie.go.kr/korean/pds/statistics/invest>;
Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998; Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various years).
Note: Percentages of total for the periods1962-1990 and 1991-1995 were calculated as follows: sum of
total amount over the period/sum of individual source country over the period.
Period/years
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(b) Outward direct investment
While the reforms following the 1997 financial crisis focused on FDI inflows, the
trend of ODI flows has also changed (see figure 5).  In particular, the rapid momentum of
the 1990s seems to have been lost.  The Republic of Korea’s ODI began to surge from the
mid-1980s, when the economy had a significant surplus on the current account, largely due
to a favourable exchange rate and low interest rates in the global capital market.  Owing to
the confidence in the current account balance, the Government gained confidence in capital
account management and removed restrictions on ODI.  Furthermore, domestic production
costs rose sharply, mainly due to the surge in wages.  This rapid upward trend lasted until
the onset of the crisis, followed by a somewhat stagnant period with some fluctuations.
The Republic of Korea’s ODI was led largely by labour-intensive and small and
medium-sized (less than $300,000) manufacturing companies, particularly since the
mid-1980s (Cho, 1995; Bank of Korea, various issues).  Manufacturing’s share of total ODI
increased from 26.4 per cent in 1986 to 56.5 per cent in 1996.  The surge in wages was the
main driving force for the exodus in textiles, clothing and primary and fabricated metals.
Asia (including ASEAN and China) received the lion’s share of this investment, followed
by North America.  In particular, ODI to China rose sharply to exploit geographical
proximity and low labour costs in small and medium-sized firms, followed by ODI to the
United States; Hong Kong, China; and Viet Nam.  In contrast to manufacturing-led ODI to
Asia, the Republic of Korea’s ODI to North America and the European Union was led by
trading companies.  This reflects an attempt by small and medium-sized firms in the
Republic of Korea to export to North America and the European Union directly, rather than
adopting the traditional method of indirect exports through local trading companies.
The relative importance of large-sized firms in ODI seems to have increased
following the 1997 financial crisis.  For example, Hyundai motor company, Samsung and
LG Electronics increased their foreign investment in Asia, North America and the European
Union (including eastern Europe) after 2000.  Despite the crisis, China remained the most
important country for foreign investment in the Republic of Korea.  The share of China in
total ODI fluctuated between 15 per cent in 2001 and 47 per cent in 2003.  In contrast with
FDI, the Republic of Korea’s ODI seemed to be little influenced by the 1997 financial
crisis.  The ODI figure dropped somewhat in 1999 but recovered to the historical level with
some fluctuation until 2003 (figure 5).  This trend reflects the strong Chinese economy and
uncertainty about the United States economy owing to the hostilities in Iraq and rising oil
prices (pull factors), as well as the surge in wages and rather weak business environment in
the home market over the period (push factors).  Manufacturing-led ODI remained
unchanged following the crisis.  This reflected the weak competitiveness of the Republic of
Korea’s non-manufacturing industries in the global market.
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The implications for small and medium-sized firms are complicated.  In contrast to
large firms, the motivation of small and medium-sized firms in carrying out foreign
investment was largely to overcome export barriers and cut labour costs (Cho, 1995).
Recently, wage costs have risen in China as the economy has maintained high growth.  As
a result, investment in Viet Nam and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including
the Kaeseong Industrial Complex, has increased.8
5. CHALLENGES FACING THE ECONOMY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA
(a) Does FDI guarantee positive spillovers?
As described in the previous section, FDI in the service sector has recently
increased sharply vis-à-vis manufacturing.  According to the Korea Trade and Investment
Association (1998, pp. 87-88), the prime reason for subsidizing FDI is to achieve the
transfer of advanced technology by multinationals.  However, the expected technology
transfer effects of FDI seem to be insignificant, as FDI was located in labour-intensive
industries rather than in capital/technology-intensive industries.  At the end of 1996, only
9.4 per cent of FDI was located in the designated industries for technology transfer.
Recent trends in FDI following the financial crisis also indicate that foreign
investment via the acquisition of outstanding stocks has surged.  The share of M and As by
foreign investors was 27.2 per cent in 1998 and 30.7 per cent in 1999, and then declined
somewhat to between 15 and 17 per cent until 2003 (Kim, 2004).  This increase in M and
As following the crisis was due largely to policy reforms allowing M and As by foreigners
and to the collapse of the asset bubble, the so-called “fire sale” following the financial crisis
(Krugman, 1998).  Interestingly, the effects of the fire sale in the manufacturing sector were
evident at the onset of the crisis.  The companies sold include Hansol Pulp and Paper, Halla
Cement and Daewoo Motor Company.  By contrast, most foreign investment in M and As
targeting service industry companies, including banks and communications, was undertaken
with a time lag of two to three years.
A large proportion of foreign investors were from international fund management
groups rather than technology-based multinationals.  As a result, the expected positive
spillover of advanced managerial know-how is also debatable.  The conflict between
Soverign Asset Management Ltd., a Dubai-based investment fund owned by two brothers
from New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea’s third largest business group, SK
Corporation, in 2003 is a good example.  Soverign attempted hostile M and As with SK
when SK had experienced difficulties resulting from an accounting scandal (Kim, 2004).
8 However, this investment is largely to produce imports for consumption in the source country, and political
uncertainties and socialist economic systems in the host countries remain a major hurdle.
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Soverign purchased 19 million shares in SK at 1,750 won per share.  The share price
increased rapidly while Soverign strategically threatened the owner-chief executive officer
in order to force the company to improve its governance system.  The estimated capital
gain to Soverign from its short-term investment in shares without tax was estimated to be
800 billion won (equivalent to $800 million).9
However, survey results imply that FDI generated positive effects for domestic
firms both in terms of technology and managerial know-how transfer in manufacturing
(Kang and others, 2003).  Furthermore, we need to consider that spillover effects are often
invisible and difficult to measure in the short run.  In addition, the definition of spillover
can be broadly understood including various side effects.  The Soverign-SK incident in
2003 resulted in an improved corporate governance system for SK, with the announcement
of the so-called “New SK Plan”.
(b) Terms of trade and market diversification
Movements in the terms of trade (TOT), as measured by the unit value of exports
divided by the unit value of imports, reflect dynamic structural change in global markets.10
Whether or not worsening TOT are caused by demand or supply factors, a country
experiencing falling TOT will nevertheless receive less in return for each unit of the goods
it exports, and vice versa.
As a result, declining TOT has three important implications for the Republic of
Korea.  First, they erode the positive impacts of improved competitiveness and reduce the
size of the surplus on the current account, given the level of exchange rates and interest
rates.  The worsening of TOT also provides a difficult policy challenge in terms of real
exchange rate alignment.  The Republic of Korea, like many East Asian countries, has often
used a sterilizing intervention approach, regardless of the nature of the shock, mainly due to
government intervention and regulation under conditions of imperfect capital mobility.
However, such sterilizing intervention could also have delayed the alignment (depreciation)
of the real exchange rate in 1996 when the current account deficit was caused by the TOT
shock rather than by the domestic investment boom.  Now, the Republic of Korea faces
9 Similarly, some United States-based companies, including New Bridge Capital and Lone Star, made a huge
amount of short-term capital gains from M and As and reselling banks and commercial buildings in the early
2000s.
10 As a result, the movement in TOT is not caused directly by the changes in the balance of the current account.
The level of investment following the crisis also dropped sharply.  However, the adverse development in TOT
between 1995 and 1996, coupled with the investment boom (including in semiconductors) began in 1994 that
had been triggered by the expected recovery of the global economy, led to a sizeable deficit on the current
account in the Republic of Korea.  This, combined with the absence of prudential supervision, resulted in
short-term foreign borrowing (particularly from financial institutions) and thereby raised the vulnerability of
the economy to the 1997 financial crisis.
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a TOT shock with a “floating” exchange rate regime and a reasonably sizeable current
account surplus.
Second, TOT affects the country’s per capita standard of living and private
consumption decisions.  Third, the magnitude of the negative impacts of structural change
depends on the elasticity of demand for exports and the ability of exporters to adjust to
changing levels of demand.  The following section focuses on the second and the third
aspects.
(i)  Movements in the terms of trade
Figure 6 shows TOT compared with income TOT and the unit price of the
Republic of Korea’s major export goods (semiconductors) and import goods (petroleum)
during the first quarter of 1994 and the second quarter of 2000.  The figure illustrates
a worsening trend in TOT over the period.  The index value of 73 (1995 = 100) for TOT in
the first half of 2000 was the worst in history.  This deterioration of TOT was largely
attributable to the drop in the unit export price of the Republic of Korea’s exports coupled
with the rising petroleum price since mid-1999.  For example, the unit export price of
semiconductors fell sharply in the mid-1990s, causing a sizeable deficit in the current
account.11  The unit price dropped from 100 in 1995 to less than 50 in 1996, and further
decreased to 12.2 in the second quarter of 2000.  Because of the worsening TOT, the
Republic of Korea needed to increase its volume of exports to improve its current account
balance.
This drop in the unit price of semiconductors is puzzling because the demand for
semiconductors was strong and supply was relatively stable.  The strong United States
economy in the 1990s was largely attributable to the boom in information technology.
While the reasons for the structural adjustment of the semiconductor price have yet to be
analysed, psychological factors in the market following the Asian financial crisis and
concern about the potential information technology-led bubble, coupled with the relatively
short life cycle of the product, seem to have affected cyclical fluctuations in price.
The lower petroleum price following the crisis, combined with the strong recovery
of the global economy, were crucial external factors that enabled the Republic of Korea to
achieve a rapid recovery.  All of the country’s oil is imported from overseas.12  However, the
11 The shares of semiconductors in total manufacturing production and in total exports were 5 per cent and 9 per
cent respectively in the early 1990s.  However, the share in production increased to 13.6 per cent in 1997 and
21 per cent in 1998.  The share in exports also increased to about 13-15 per cent in the late 1990s.  The share
of the Republic of Korea’s electronics production in the global total was 4.4 per cent in 1997, making it the
fourth largest producer following the United States, Japan and Germany.
12 For example, the Republic of Korea’s imports of crude oil in 2000 were worth about $25 billion, which is
equivalent to about 5.4 per cent of GDP in the same year.
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Figure 6.  Terms of trade, income terms of trade, unit export and
import price for selected commodities
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Source: Bank of Korea (various years).  Economic Statistics Yearbook.
petroleum price began to rise significantly from the second half of 1999 owing to lower
production, and this caused the deterioration in TOT.  The index number for TOT rose from
60 in 1999 to around 150 in late 2000.  Figure 6 also shows that income TOT, which
measures import ability by total exports (value), was rising all the time, a situation largely
due to the increased volume of exports.
Figure 7 shows that the decline in the unit value of heavy and chemical industry
exports has been most noticeable since the mid-1990s.  This decline was caused largely by
lower prices for semiconductors, chemicals and steel.  In contrast, the price index for
information technology-related products, a major emerging export item for the Republic of
Korea, was higher than the average index for heavy products and chemicals.
Was there a pass-through effect of the won currency depreciation on the Republic
of Korea’s imports following the crisis? The pass-through effect of depreciation refers to the
proportion of depreciation that is translated into higher import prices in the depreciating
country, and suggests that the unit price of imports in the depreciating country may also
drop (Knetter, 1993).  The apparent drop in import prices following the crisis seems to be
consistent with this hypothesis.  However, this drop in import prices was caused largely by
the declining prices of petroleum and industrial commodities over the period.  Petroleum
prices declined from $19.30 per barrel of oil in 1997 to $13.70 per barrel in 1998, before
rising to about $30 by mid-2000.13
13 The average quantity of petroleum imports in the Republic of Korea between 1997 and 1998 was about
850 million barrels.
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The Republic of Korea’s major import suppliers, including the United States and
Japan, may be expected not to respond strategically to the depreciation of the won.  The
market in the Republic of Korea is assumed to be too small for these exporters to take
action in order to preserve their market shares and stabilize prices in the buyer’s currency
relative to a constant markup policy.14  Thus, it is assumed that the decline in the unit value
of exports is proportionately larger than that in imports.  By the same token, there was no
difference in the Republic of Korea’s bilateral trade balance with Japan and the United
States.  However, the depreciation of the won vis-à-vis the Japanese yen raised the won cost
of imports to the Republic of Korea (the dollar price, however, was unchanged and thus the
trade balance remained the same in dollar terms), and the profit margins of firms in the
Republic of Korea in local currency were squeezed by intermediate imports from Japan.  As
a result, the Republic of Korea’s dependency on Japan for intermediate imports could
moderate the positive effects of depreciation on exports at a given profit margin.
Source: IMF (various years).  International Financial Statistics.
Note: Unit export price (light industry) is unit value index of exports for light industry, unit export price
heavy and chemical industry is that for heavy and chemical industry, and information technology is that for
information technology-related products.
Figure 7.  Trends in unit value indexes of exports
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14 Athukorala and Menon (1994) also confirm that the incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes is
pervasive with Japanese exports.  However, the paper rejects the widely held view that Japanese export firms
have relied more heavily on pricing to market strategies during the period of yen appreciation in order to
maintain market share.  In spite of this, whether or not Japanese exporters and United States exporters showed
different pricing behaviours in the Republic of Korea following the crisis is an interesting empirical question.
The Republic of Korea was the second largest market for United States exports in Asia.  The share of the
Republic of Korea and Japan in United States exports was 3.7 and 11.4 per cent respectively and that in United
States imports was 3.5 and 18.7 per cent respectively in 1991.
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(ii) Export market destinations:  demand for exports
Table 2 indicates three important points regarding the Republic of Korea’s export
markets.  First, the Republic of Korea has diversified its export markets over the last two
decades.  Until the crisis, exports to ASEAN and China increased at the expense of those to
the United States.  The traditional heavy reliance on the United States market had been
declining until the onset of the crisis.  Exports to the United States rose until the mid-1980s,
reaching a peak of 40.7 per cent of the total in 1986, and then began declining to 1997
(the net exports to the United States between 1980 and 1990 increased by 13.9 per cent, but
between 1990 and 1997 they declined by 48.7 per cent).
Table 2.  Shares of the Republic of Korea’s major export countries
(Percentage)
United
United States Japan Kingdom- China
Germany
1980 (A) 26.7 17.7 8.4 6.6 (5.0) 0.1
1985 40.3 17.1 7.1 5.7 (3.9) 0.2
1990 (B) 30.4 19.9 7.2 8.8 (5.9) 0.9
1995 19.4 13.7 7.1 13.6 (8.2) 7.4
1996 16.7 12.1 6.1 14.9 (9.9) 8.8
1997 (C) 15.6 10.7 6.3 13.8 (9.6) 9.8
1998 17.3 9.3 6.2 11.4 (8.3) 9.0
1999 (D) 20.5 10.9 6.2 12.0 (8.6) 9.5
2000 21.8 11.9 6.1 10.6 (7.3) 10.7
2001 20.7 11.0 5.2 9.5 (6.8) 12.1
2002 20.2 9.3 5.2 11.3 (8.7) 14.6
2003 17.6 8.9 5.0 10.4 (8.1) 18.1
2004 16.9 8.5 5.5 9.5 (7.3) 19.6
Coefficient of variationa 36.7 27.7 11.6 31.8(29.8) 78.1
Adjustment rate
(B-A)/A*100 13.9 12.4 -14.2 33.3(18.0) 800.0
(C-B)/B*100 -48.7 -46.2 -12.5 56.8(62.7) 988.9
(D-C)/C*100 30.1 1.8 -1.6 -13.1(-10.4) -4.1
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association (various years).  Trend of Foreign Trade.
a  Standard deviation/mean *100.2 (1980-1999).
b ASEAN 5 is composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
c In ASEAN 4, Singapore is excluded from the ASEAN 5 list of countries.
ASEAN 5b
(ASEAN 4)c
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In contrast, the shares of exports to ASEAN and China rose sharply until the onset
of the crisis.  The Republic of Korea’s exports to ASEAN included capital-intensive goods
to support the industrialization of that region.  Noticeably, this fast growth in exports to
ASEAN took place in conjunction with the surge in the Republic of Korea’s ODI to the
region over the period.  Exports to China surged dramatically in the mid-1990s due mainly
to the establishment of diplomatic relations in the early 1990s, as well as to the country’s
geographical proximity.  Meanwhile, exports from the Republic of Korea to the United
Kingdom and Germany were relatively stable, although they have declined since the crisis.
Because of the increase in exports to ASEAN and China, the Republic of Korea was able to
diversify its export markets away from its heavy reliance on the United States market
between 1980 and 1997.
Second, this geographical composition has changed since the crisis.  In particular,
the relative importance of the United States market increased again until 2000, when it once
again began to decline.  In particular, China emerged as an important market, especially at
the expense of the ASEAN and Japanese markets.  The strong United States economy over
the last 10 years has led to an increase in imports, whereas the ASEAN economy lost
purchasing power following the crisis.15  The strong United States economy was largely
attributed to the growth in information technology industries, which raised the demand for
semiconductors, the Republic of Korea’s most important export item.
This change in relative importance is indicated by the adjustment ratio (measured
by (D-C)/C*100 in table 2), with a ratio of 30.1 per cent for the United States, compared
with -13.1 per cent for the five founding members of ASEAN.16  As a result, the share of
these developed countries increased from 32.6 per cent in 1997 to 37.4 per cent in 1999.
However, it is not certain whether this higher reliance on developed countries rather than
developing ones suggests that exports will be more stable.  The information on the
coefficient of variation, as measured by the standard deviation divided by the mean, seems
to suggest that exports to the United States market were more volatile than those to other
markets.17  In fact, the Republic of Korea currently faces some major challenges in United
States trade, such as an expected increase in competition for the market from other
countries affected (depreciation of currencies) by the 1997 crisis as well as protectionist
pressures caused by the imbalance in trade between the United States and the Republic of
Korea.
Third, the sustained growth of the Chinese economy and the recovery of the
ASEAN and Japanese economies are factors also crucial to the Republic of Korea’s exports
and growth.  While there was a drop in the relative importance of the ASEAN markets
15 In the late 1990s, the United States GDP accounted for around a quarter of the global GDP.
16 The extraordinarily high number for China was due to the small number of base years (1980 and 1990) and
thus comparative analysis provides little information.
17 Refer to footnote 8.
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following the crisis, the complementary relationship between the Republic of Korea and the
region indicates the importance of these markets for the country’s exports.  However, the
relative importance of the ASEAN market after 2000 fluctuated somewhat; it was below its
historical trend in the mid-1990s.  Recently, the Japanese market has experienced
fluctuations within an overall declining trend, and is still less significant than it was before
the crisis.
The importance of the China market is particularly noticeable.  In 1999, China
emerged as the third largest single market for exports from the Republic of Korea (9.4 per
cent of total exports) followed by the United States (20.3 per cent) and Japan (10.9 per
cent), although the five founding members of ASEAN (12.0 per cent), as a region, is the
most important destination.  The importance of China increased continuously until 2004.
China’s share in the Republic of Korea’s total exports was 14.6 per cent, making China the
second most important market for exporters in the Republic of Korea in 2002.  When
combined with Hong Kong, China, the share was 20.8 per cent, making it the Republic of
Korea’s most important market in that year.  This increasing importance of the China
market occurred despite the 1997 crisis.  The share of that market in the Republic of
Korea’s total exports reached 19.6 per cent, and it became the single most important
destination for exports from the Republic of Korea in 2004.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This analytical research study indicates that the Republic of Korea has experienced
significant changes in both trade and FDI inflows as well as outflows following the 1997
Asian financial crisis.  The Republic of Korea’s reliance on the United States market and
China for its exports rose sharply following the crisis.  In particular, China has emerged as
the most important export destination, largely at the expense of the ASEAN market.  This
was due to its geographical proximity to the Republic of Korea and the increased
competitiveness of Korean products in the China market.  The United States consumption
of products from the Republic of Korea increased sharply at the onset of the crisis.  This
was critically important for the restoration of foreign reserves and the subsequent
stabilization of the capital market, although the relative importance of the United States
market has declined again since 2001.
The increase in the surplus on its current account helped the Republic of Korea to
restore foreign investors’ confidence in the economy, which is evidenced by the surge in
foreign direct investment.  The crisis had a significant impact on FDI inflows both in terms
of investment source and host industry.  FDI increased sharply following the crisis and this
rapid increase was due largely to improved United States and European Union investment
in the service sector, which is consistent with the wealth hypothesis of FDI inflows.  In
particular, M and As by foreign investors increased significantly following the crisis.
Meanwhile, Japanese FDI dried up, although it picked up again sharply in 2004, and this
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caused the overall drop in FDI in the manufacturing sector.  However, the magnitude of
expected spillover effects from multinationals, including the transfer of advanced
technology and managerial know-how, is still the subject of debate, which requires further
investigation.  Further study is needed on the implications (e.g., supply chain management
and internationalization strategy) of the crisis for the Republic of Korea’s ODI (particularly
from small and medium-sized firms) in the context of developing countries, especially in
the Asian and Pacific region.
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